銆愭椂闂淬€戯細2017骞9鏈21鏃 11.00-13.00
銆愬湴鐐广€戯細浼熶鸡妤401
銆愪富璁层€戯細鑲栧媷娉
銆愰鐩€戯細Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts
銆愭憳瑕併€戯細Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to the principal. We study the optimal contract, which involves monetary payments and monitoring sessions that depend on past arrival times. The optimal schedules of payment and monitoring demonstrate different structures depending on model parameters, and may involve monitoring for a random period of time. Overall, the optimal dynamic contracts are simple to describe, easy to compute and implement, and intuitive to explain.
鏈€鏂板姩鎬
